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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
ROLAND LAVAR DENISON,
Appellant,
— vs. —

No. 8554
Civil

ALVIN D, CHAPMAN,
et al,
Respondents

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action is to recover for damages to property and
for personal injuries sustained by appellant in a collision
of his station wagon, traveling south in the west outside
land of a four lane highway, with a semi-trailer oil truck,
which was traveling north with another automobile, with
the result that the semi-trailer crossed over the highway
into the lanes of southbound traffic and directly in front
of the station wagon.
The semi-trailer was owned by Continental Oil Company and was being driven by its employee, Alvin D,
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Chapman- The third car was being driven by Dora Hartley.
The accident occurred the evening of February 22,
1955, on U. S. Highway 89-91, at about 20 North Street,
in Provo, on the hill which forms the north bank of the
Provo River approach. This is a four lane paved highway
with gravel shoulders and guard rails on both sides. It is
68 feet wide between the guard rails.
Denison was driving south from Orem toward Provo.
He slowed down to about 15 miles per hour as he approached the crest of the hill and did not increase his
speed thereafter. Hartley entered the highway on a road
coming from the east and was driving up the hill going
north, in the outside lane, at about 15 miles per hour,
as she testified. Chapman was also going north up the
hill and at the time of the collision with the Hartley car
he was about one foot west of the dividing line between
the two north traffic lanes. He was traveling 35 miles
per hour.
Chapman had been on the road all day, starting early
in the morning at Woods Cross with a load to Panguitch
and reaching the scene of the accident on his return journey. He saw the Hartley car come up to the stop sign
and then proceed up the hill in the east lane. He was then
driving in the east lane. As he drew toward the Hartley
car he moved over into the inside lane so as to pass her.
He was going 35 miles per hour. When he reached a
point almost parallel with the Hartley car, the latter
wavered and slipped and went into a spin into Chapman's
lane and the semi-trailer collided with the Hartley automobile. The latter was thrown clockwise to the right and
came to rest facing south near the east guard rail; Chapman lost control of his vehicle and it diagonaled across
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the south bound lanes, collided with the west guard rail
and stopped so as to block both lanes.
Denison coming down the hill in the west lane, as
far over as he could get, saw the lights of the semi-trailer
as it commenced to cross over, and, feeling that something
was amiss and that danger threatened, switched off his
ignition and attempted to bring his vehicle to a stop.
The highway on the hill was covered with a coat of
ice, and was very slippery clear across the pavement and
from the crest to the foot.
The trailer came across so suddenly and the road was
so slippery that Denison was unable to bring his station
wagon to a stop. He could not pass to the right because of
the guard rail and a deep gulch; he could not pass to his
left because the trailer blocked both lanes and he could
not face oncoming traffic in the east lanes. So he sat tight
and collided with the trailer.
The action is against Chapman, driver of the oil tanker,
the Continental Oil Company, owner and employer, and
Dora Hartley, driver of the third vehicle.
The theory of appellant's case is that both Chapman
and Mrs. Hartley were negligent in the operation of their
vehicles and that as a proximate result thereof the appellant sustained his damages and injuries.
At the close of our case in chief the court, on motions
of respondents, took the case from the jury and dismissed
our complaint, holding that we had failed to produce any
evidence from which the jury might find that either Chapman or Mrs. Hartley was negligent in any manner; and
that the whole series of events was the result of some accident; hence there was no liability.
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Appellant feels that there was ample evidence to take
the case to the jury on the issues of negligence and proximate cause; and therefore the court erred in granting the
motions and dismissing the complaint. So we present to
this court the evidence relating to those issues and invoke
the ruling of this court as to its sufficiency.
The following is a summary of the testimony of the
witnesses relating to such issues:
1. Richard H. Levin testified: (Tr. 7)
He is a Provo City police officer; was on duty the
evening of this accident. Shortly before the accident he
drove up the hill and turned around and was waiting
for the traffic to clear so that he could return back south
at the time Denison drove out from Orem, and came down
the hill behind the Denison car but did not see the collision,
but when he got to the top of the grade he could see
there had been an accident. (Tr. 10) Other cars were
there ahead of him. The oil truck was angled in and locked
onto the guard rail with its front bumper. The station
wagon had collided with the truck just forward of the
traction wheels of the traction unit, between the first and
second pair of wheels. (Tr. 11)
The highway was very icy. It was slick enough that
a car coming to a stop on the hill and then trying to
proceed ahead would have quite a little trouble getting
traction. The sheet of ice extended from the top to the
bottom of the hill. There was no snow on top of the ice.
(Tr. 16)
The right hand wheels of the Denison vehicle were
over the edge of the pavement and on the gravel shoulder.
(Tr. 16) Witness talked with both Chapman and Mrs.
Hartley. Chapman said he was going around 30 to 35
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Her car was damaged on the front fender and front
wheel, a dent in the back door, and a small dent on the
rear fender,
6. Alvin D. Chapman testified:
He had driven that day from Woods Cross to Panguitch and back to Provo. He had taken no rest but coffee
stops and about an hour and a half to unload. (Tr. 84)
As he approached the hill he saw Mrs. Hartley pull
up to the stop sign and stop before entering the highway.
He had come up the hill in the right hand lane; but when
he saw her pull into the highway and turn north in that
lane, he pulled over into the left lane. (Tr. 86)
The whole surface of the highway was covered with
slick ice, (Tr. 87) from guard rail to guardrail It was
a very dangerous condition to drive on. Mrs. Hartley did
not seem to be having any trouble when he pulled over.
He testified at the trial that he didn't increase his
speed on the hill to pass Hartley. (Tr. 88)
But in his deposition he testified that when he first
saw her he was going about 20 to 25 miles per hour. (Tr.
88) and that after he first saw her he increased his speed
and was going about 35 miles when he overtook her and
at the time of the collision with her car. (Tr. 89) He did
see her car the instant before the impact. (Tr. 90) He did
not see her in the spin. (Tr. 91) He imagined he was
right close to the back end of her car when she had
trouble. But he could not see the back end of her car.
He did not recollect whether or not he saw the Hartley
car go into the spin. (Tr. 92) He did not remember
whether he tried to turn to his left to avoid the collision.
(Tr. 93)
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He admitted in his direct examination that he had
testified as follows on his deposition:
"Guess we were about three-quarters of the
way up the hill and I don't know what happened
to her car, but the first thing I knew she was coming back down the hill, either backwards or sideways and we collided," (Tr. 97)
"and we collided and when her car hit the
front of my truck, it just hit the bumper and the
f
front wheel and evidently the front tire because
: I lost control of the truck and it skidded across
the road sideways and I hit the guardrail and the
truck slipped up the guardrail kinda so my truck
was sitting on an angle and my trailer was following up the road. My trailer was out in the middle
of the road and my truck was across the two lanes."
(Tr.97)
He testified on cross examination by his own attorney
that a speed of 35 miles per hour was safer for him than
15 miles because of the danger of a spin-out at the lower
speed. (Tr. 105)
7. Roland Lavar Denison testified:
His car was in good condition; the brakes and steering apparatus were in good working order; he had winter
tires on the rear wheels. (Tr. 114) The road was slick
in spots before he came to the top of the hill going south;
from the top of the hill on down it was slick all over. (Tr.
116) About a quarter of a mile before he came to the
top of the hill he took his foot off the gas and the car
slowed down. (Tr. 117) Just before he got to the guard
rail he noticed another car was slipping, he could see it
in another car's lights, and he shifted into second at that
point, which was about 12 feet north of the west guard[
rail. He tried to brake but the car kept going. (Tr. 118119) The car which he observed was weaving in another
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car's lights was in the east lane of traffic. The car was
just slipping back and forth, not spinning. (Tr. 120) It
was clear over on the east side of the highway. The road
was clear of traffic ahead of him. (Tr. 121) When he
went into second gear his car slowed down; he thought he
was going v25 miles per hour or slower when he made the
shift. (Tr. 122) The next thing he noticed the truck was
coming across the road, so he turned off his ignition switch.
There was nothing more to do. "We hit." He thought
the truck was 50 to 60 feet ahead of him when he saw
it coming across the road. He did not see the collision
between the truck and the Hartley car, nor did he hear
it. (Tr. 123) He did not try to turn around the truck to
his left because he might collide with northbound cars.
He was on the right side of the road as far as he could
go. (Tr. 124)
He did not at any time travel at 35 miles per hour
after he passed the turn-off road, which was about 782
feet north of the crest of the hill where you can see the
rest of the highway. (Tr. 137-138) From the crest of the
hill where you can see on down the road to the point of
collision is 1,312 feet. (Tr. 139) The sum of those distances
is 2,094 feet. At no time did he travel at 35 miles per
hour in that distance. (Tr. 139)
8. Douglas Denison testified:
He is 11 years old; was riding in the station wagon
with his father. Before they came to the road that turns
off the car was going 35 miles per hour by the speedometer.
(Tr. 148) His father shifted gears before they got to the
guard rail. (Tr. 148-149) After he shifted his father cut
off the motor. (Tr. 150 About 200 feet before the collision he noticed the speedometer; it was not over 15 miles
per hour. (Tr. 151-155)
**"*"
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II.
ARGUMENT
Point 1.
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO TAKE
THE CASE TO THE JURY ON THE ISSUES OF NEGLIGENCE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE; HENCE THE
COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS'
MOTIONS AND IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT.
Plaintiff was driving carefully, well within the estimated safe limit for the place. He slowed down at the
turn-off, which is about a quarter of a mile back of the
crest of the hill where one can see the highway clear down
to the foot. When he came to where he could see down
the slope he shifted into second gear, and used his brakes
as much as they could be used on the ice. His brakes were
in good condition and he had winter tires on the rear
wheels. He was driving on the extreme west lane, with
his right hand wheels on the gravel shoulder feeling for
traction. When he saw the Hartley car, over in the east
lane, weaving in the light of the truck, he felt there might
be trouble, so he turned off his ignition and continued
his efforts to slow down by the use of his brakes. He had
the right-of-way in his lane. No one had any right to cut
in ahead of him from the east at that place and block
him off from proceeding down the hill. He had a right
to assume that no one would do so. He was alert to what
was going on, or so the jury might well have inferred,
and paying careful attention to the situation, the road
ahead and the traffic. The truck cut in ahead of him,
collided with the guard rail and stopped, blocking both
lanes of south bound traffic. It came across when plaintiff
was within about 50 feet of the point of impact. There
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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was not anything that plaintiff could do to avoid the
collision. He was not negligent.
It is otherwise with respect to respondents. A collision occurred on the two lanes of north bound traffic
between the truck and Hartley's car. The north bound
lanes were of ample width to accommodate both vehicles,
with room to spare. Mrs. Hartley for at least part of
the distance after she entered the highway traveled well
over on the east side. Chapman started up the hill in the
east lane but moved over into the other lane to pass her.
He was traveling 35 miles per hour. She said she thought
she might have been going 15 or 20. The police officers
testified that in their judgment 15 or 20 was the maximum
safe speed at that place. The hill was covered with a slick
coat of ice, from guard rail to guard rail and from the
top to the bottom. Both drivers knew of this condition.
It was apparent to them as soon as they started up.
It was not as if one or the other had suddenly come
upon a slick spot in an otherwise safe surface, or a pot
hole in a pavement which could not be seen until a driver
was too close to slow down or turn to avoid being thrown
off course, or spot of gravel in an otherwise firm surface.
It was a dangerous highway at that place and both
drivers were well aware of the dangers.
There was no traffic immediately ahead of them, to
their rear, or on either side to distract their attention.
Their vehicles collided within a foot of the dividing
line between the north traffic lanes, as Chapman was in
the act of passing the Hartley car. The jury might well
have believed that there was plenty of room in his own
lane for Chapman to turn to his left to avoid a collision;
and that he should have done so, and that he was negligent for not doing so.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It was Chapman's duty in overtaking and passing Hartley to pass to her left at a safe distance. Sec. 41-6-55, UCA,
1953.
It was also his duty to drive at a speed no greater
than was reasonable and prudent under the conditions
and having regard to the actual and potential hazards
then existing, and to control his speed as was necessary
to avoid colliding with the other vehicle. Sec. 41-6-46,
UCA, 1953.
The jury had a right to find that Chapman did not
overtake and attempt to pass Hartley at a safe distance;
and to conclude therefrom that he was negligent in this
respect, which negligence was the cause of the collision
with the Hartley car and also with plaintiff's station wagon.
The jury had the right to find and conclude that the
speed of 35 miles per hour was greater than was reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard
to the actual and potential hazards then existing, and that
he failed to control his speed to the extent necessary to
avoid colliding with the Hartley car. If they so found, then
this was negligence as a matter of law, being in violation
of the statute. The jury had the right, furthermore, to find
and conclude that this negligence was a proximate cause
of the collision between the truck and the station wagon.
At the trial Chapman testified that he did not observe the Hartley car immediately before the collision,
his attenion being centered on the business of keeping the
truck going and on the road ahead. But he also admitted
that he had testified in his deposition that he saw the
Hartley car sliding down the hill toward him immediately
before the collision and that he did nothing to avoid a
collision. From this and the other evidence the jury might
well have concluded and found that Chapman was negliDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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gent for not paying attention to the Hartley car, which
was having trouble making the grade, and in failing to
turn to his left or to slow his speed to avoid the accident;
or the jury might have found that he in fact did see the
Hartley car going into the slide toward his lane and that
he was negligent in not taking any measures to avoid the
accident. If he saw the Hartley car, over on the east side
of the east lane, waving about and sliding toward his lane
and even sliding back toward him, the jury had the right
to find that he was negligent in not turning to his left in
an attempt to avoid a collision.
It taxes credulity to believe that the accident could
have happened if both Chapman and Hartley had been
driving with due care communsurate with the hazards
which they both knew existed.
It is a fact that both these drivers failed to keep control of their vehicles. The jury had the right to find that
they were negligent for such failure. The jury had the
right to find that Mrs. Hartley was negligent for even
trying to negotiate the hill at the time, for it is apparent
from her own testimony that she experienced great difficuly in keeping her car under control almost from the
moment she entered the highway. The jury had a right
to find that due care on her part in the dangerous situation in which she found herself required that she pull
over to the side of the road and stop, instead of fighting
the wheel and trying to make the grade.
It is manifest from the evidence that Hartley and Chapman by the operation of their vehicles set in motion a chain
of events which led directly to the collision between the
station wagon and the truck and to the resulting damages
to the plaintiff. If Hartley had been driving with due
care, if Chapman had not been traveling so fast or if
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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he had been paying attention and had even tried to avoid
a collision, when he saw, if he did see, the Hartley car
sliding down the hill toward him, then this accident would
not have happened.
It is in evidence that other drivers had successfully
negotiated that hill immediately before and immediately
after this accident. There is no evidence that any other
drivers were involved in accidents there. So it was not
impossible to drive up or down the hill. If others could
drive successfully over that dangerous highway, it is not
unreasonable to conclude that Chapman and Hartley could
have done so by the exercise of due care.
It is our contention that there was ample evidence
to take the case to the jury upon the two issues, namely,
(1) the negligence of Chapman and Hartley; and (2) that
such negligence was the proximate cause of the collision
between the truck and the station wagon and of the resulting damage to plaintiff. Hence that the court was in
error in sustaining the defendants' motions and in dismissing the complaint. The court held as a matter of law
that the evidence showed that there was no negligence
and that the collisions were wholly accidental and that
there was no liability.
The evidence shows how Chapman was operating and
the speed of the truck; how Hartley was struggling to get
her vehicle up the hill; the highly dangerous condition of
the road, of which both of them were aware and saw
before they commenced the ascent. It was for the
jury to say whether either or both exercised due care in
th circumstances; and if not, whether the negligence found
was a proximate cause of the damages to plaintiff. These
are conclusions of fact to be found by the jury, not conclusions of law to be decided by the court. In deciding
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them as matters of law, the court usurped the functions
of the jury and denied plaintiff of his right to the judgment
of eight citizens on the issues.
There are hundreds of cases in the books in which the
subject of skidding motor vehicles is involved. Questions
of negligence and proximate cause have been raised in
almost every conceivable manner. They all differ on the
facts. We find none that can be said to be of controlling
weight in this case. We point the way to some of them
by citing:
Barret, et al. v. Caddo Transfer & Warehouse
Company, Inc., 165 La. 1075, 116 So. 563, 58
A. L. R. 261; and the annotation commencing at
page 264 of the latter volume.
Megan v. Stevens, et al., 91 F. (2d) 419; 113
A. L. R. 992; and the annotation in the latter
volume commencing at page 1002.
It is urged that the case should have been submitted,
to the jury under the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur even
though the Court had determined the matters foregoing
against the plaintiff Denison. The facts surrounding this
case clearly present a situation bringing into application
the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, The icy condition upon
the hill was not a sudden one presented only upon the
hill but was generally prevalent. The defendent Chapman
was acrossed the path of the plaintiff in the south-bound
traffic lanes which could only have been the result of
someones negligence. The oil tanker was under the exclusive control of the defendant Chapman and there was
no negligent act on the part of Denison which created
the situation.
Barrera v. De La Torre 300 P2 100, California.
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It is respectfully submitted that the court erred in
taking the case from the jury and dismissing the complaint; and therefore the judgment should be reversed and
appellant granted a new trial
Respectfully submitted.
Dilworth Woolley
Manti, Utah
Warren M. O'Gara
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
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